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Preface 
 
Nobuya Hashimoto 
 
This publication is the proceedings of a panel titled “Citizenship and Memory in 
Eastern Europe and East Asia: A Comparison.” It was presented at the 25th 
International Conference of Europeanists: Europe and the World: Mobilities, 
Values & Citizenship, held from March 28 to 30, 2018, in Chicago, USA. The 
panel was organized by the international research project, “Interdisciplinary 
Research on the Function of National Histories and Collective Memories for the 
Democracy in the Globalized Society [NHCM].”  
   The NHCM was commissioned and sponsored by the Japan Society for the 
Promotion of Science [JSPS – one of the most influential governmental funding 
agencies working for the promotion of sciences, including humanities and the 
social sciences, in Japan] within the framework of its Topic-Setting Program to 
Advance Cutting-Edge Humanities and Social Sciences Research, Global 
Initiatives, 2016-2019. This program seeks to establish “dialogue and 
interaction between Japanese and overseas researchers and the generation of 
globally significant results through the advancement of international joint 
researches across diverse fields of the humanities and the social sciences and 
the building of robust international networks.”  
   When the project started, the JSPS’s Commiss ion for the Promotion of 
Humanities and Social Sciences assigned us the mission to develop 
“interdisciplinary research on exclusivism and democracy in the globalized 
society” (https://www.jsps.go.jp/english/e-kadai/global/index.html.) This mission 
was proposed based on the concerns of commission members about the “diffusion 
of ethnic, racial, religious cultural exclusivism, and hatred toward the ‘other’ 
under globalization, and the crises of democracy in the contemporary world.” In 
fact, according to a member of JSPS’s Commission, the agenda-setting of the 
program was prompted by the incident of Charlie Hebdo in Paris and its 
aftermath. This is an indication of the commission’s insight into the intensified 
crises of contemporary democracy arising from the globalized social and cultural 
divides.  
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   Tasked with this meaningful but difficult assignment, we began to 
organize a research group with 21 colleagues from Japan, including mainly 
historians and some specialists of vernacular studies, political sciences,  and 
theology, and started to align the assignment to the context of history and 
memory studies. Simultaneously, we invited foreign scholars from Korea, 
Germany, Poland, the United States, Australia, and Canada as partners and 
advisers in our project, based on the preceding research projects that we had 
organized earlier with foreign colleagues. The focal point of the project is based 
on the following questions:  
 How have different histories and memories been constructed within the 
national framework? 
 How have complex past events been mobilized for political or diplomatic 
use between/within nations? 
 What is the mechanism through which histories and memories function 
as dividing forces and exclude the artificially constructed concept of 
“others”?  
 What is the role and responsibility of history and historians in the face 
of endangered democracy? 
The panel in Chicago was organized to clarify the meanings of citizenship in 
light of these interests, aiming at a comparison between European and Asian 
experiences. As the "Introduction" by Professor Hiromi Komori, a chairperson of 
the panel, explains its object and structure, I do not need to describe them here. 
Although Professor Constantin Iordachi of the Central European University 
sent in his excellent paper “Dual Citizenship and (re)Imagined National 
Communities: In Post-Communist Romania and Hungary” for the panel, and 
Professor Carol Gluck and Dr. Zuzanna Bogumił referred to his paper in their 
comments, he could not, unfortunately, contribute his paper to this Proceedings. 
   The NHCM's aims, activities, and results are presented in detail on its 
website in five different languages (http://history-memory.kwansei.ac.jp/en/ 
index.html). This publication is also an attempt to inform global audiences of 
the NHCM's activities and to preserve them for further discussion regarding the 
issue. The NHCM itself has concluded its official activities since the project 
term, as settled by the JSPS, expired toward the end of 2019, but we hope to 
v 
continue and develop international scholarly dialogues and discussions on our 
theme, which is increasingly gaining significance amid the global crises of 
democracy, human rights, and mutual tolerance among different nations.  
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Introduction to panel proceedings 
 
Hiromi Komori 
 
The Objective of the panel 
   These proceedings contain papers presented at the panel of the 25th 
International Conference of Europeanists: Europe and the World: Mobilities, 
Values & Citizenship, held at Chicago in March 2018. Under the title 
“Citizenship and Memory in Eastern Europe and East Asia: A Comparison, three 
papers were presented, which followed by the comments.  
   One of the foundations of modern nation-states is a sense of belonging, 
developed on the premise of citizen’s  equal membership in a society, and 
supported by their individual consents. However, changes have been taking 
place in this premise. 
   In the age of globalization and international migration, the debate on 
citizenship in ‘Western’ Europe has diversified, with concepts such as 
multi-tiered citizenship and ‘light citizenship’ emerging. They focus on the 
liberal character of the ideas involved, and the changing nature of the role of 
social integration. Although the liberal citizenship has not been always 
predominant even in ‘Western’ Europe, especially after the September 11 attack 
in 2001. 
   Regarding these changes both in the ideas and in the practices of 
citizenship, there are commonalities between the former socialist states of 
‘Eastern’ Europe and the countries of East Asia. Namely they  include the ethnic 
segregation in a society at home and the tightening of relationships with 
‘compatriots’ abroad through dual citizenship. These phenomena in Eastern 
Europe as well as in East Asia demand us to compare the historical background 
and the current situation of them. 
   Especially we examine the relationship between history/memory and 
citizenship. Taking into consideration factors, such as regime transition and 
redemarcation of borders, we explore the influences of discrepancies in the sense 
of national belonging, fellow-feeling and identity politics in a state as well as in 
international relationship. Hopefully our inquiries would provide useful 
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perspectives and insights on the acceleration of intolerance, exclusionist 
attitudes, and crisis of democracy. 
 
Contributors 
   Our panel consists of 3 papers and 2 discussants, as briefly introduced in 
the following. 
   Yudai Anegawa presents the case of Hungary. Currently, the historical 
narratives that are similar in content to interwar “Christian nationalist” ideas 
are shared by supporters of the Government of Victor Orban and the far-right 
political forces. At the same time, recent Hungarian politics appears as typical 
European right-wing populism with its racist and anti-European Universalist 
attitudes. In his paper, Anegawa disentangles the intricate coincidences. 
   Seung-Min Lee deals with the policies as well as the attitudes in Korean 
society regarding compatriot/Overseas Koreans. Lee examines the historical 
origin and development of the Korean Government’s perception toward the 
overseas Koreans and the Korean nation. Her interests include the influence of 
historical memory in the processes of legally defining who should be a member 
of Korean nation. 
   Sara Park presents the immigration control of the post-war Japanese 
Government based on the historical documents. Park claims that the 
immigration control system enjoyed considerable leeway under the certain 
circumstances in the treatment of immigrants as well as ethnic minorities in 
post-war Japan. 
   Originally the fourth paper on dual citizenship in post-communist 
Romania and Hungary was also included in panel. For the unexpected reason 
the fourth speaker could not attend the symposium and the paper was just 
delivered to the audience.    
   Finally, a few words about insightful comments by the discussants. 
Zuzanna Bogumił refers to citizenship as a historical compensation for the 
injustice the ethnic kin experienced outside homeland in the past. As for Carol 
Gluck points out that the countries of Eastern Europe and East Asia share the 
freezing memory during the Cold War period and the liberation from the Cold 
War narratives.  
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   Here I will repeat the question asked by Gluck. What does it mean 
citizenship beyond the border? As Bogumił  argues, whether such a non- 
territorial citizenship functions only as moral capital. 
   We hope these proceedings serves as a good launching point for those 
having interest on issues discussed here.   
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Ideology or racism? 
The historical origin of immigration control regime 
in post-war Japan 
 
Sara Park 
 
1. Introduction  
 
   What defines borderline of citizenship? How people see the borderlines in 
particular historical and/or social settings? This paper tries to answer these 
questions through immigration control policies in postwar Japan. Japan is often 
referred as a highly homogeneous country that ethnic, racial and national 
memberships virtually overlap. In fact, the percentage of registered foreign 
population in Japan (2.2% in January 20191) is considerably law in OECD 
countries, making Japan as almost ethnically homogeneous country. Regardless 
you underline its merits or demerits, such high homogeneity is still regarded as 
a particularity of Japanese society. This condition generates various arguments; 
Japan is one of the few industrialized countries not to have experienced the 
tremendous inflow of international migrants2; Post-war social homogeneity was 
built on Japan’s high level of income equality3; geographical isolation of Japan 
supported cultural homogeneity4.  
On the other hand, the myth of homogeneity has often received criticisms 
and fictitiousness. Sociologists in Japan have pointed out that the “100 million 
middle class consciousness” was just a fantasy among certain social sectors 5. 
Indigenous peoples in Hokkaido and Okinawa have not been publicly recognized, 
nor the suppression by the Japanese Government has not been accused yet 6.  
This paper argues that the ethnic homogeneity in contemporary Japanese 
society is a result of excluding ethnic diversity from national membership. 
So-called immigration control regime7 consists of immigration control and 
refugee recognition act, nationality act and sometimes family registration act. 
While high arbitrariness and wide discretion in immigration control regime are 
often criticized8, scholars and activists have argued their origins. Some state 
such arbitrariness and discretion are residuum of Japan’s colonialism 9, others 
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emphasize influence of the Cold War in the northeast Asia 10. The former sees 
unstable residential rights of Koreans and Taiwanese from the Imperial 
Ordinance of Alien Registration (in 1947) to the notification of special 
permanent residency (in 1991) vividly signifies incomplete decolonization of 
former Japan Empire.  For the latter, it is the logic of “friend -enemy distinction” 
by Carl Schmitt under the Cold War. 
However, neither of post-colonial racism or anti-communism ideology can 
fully explain the historical transition of the immigration control policy. 
Although often regarded as ethnically identical, Koreans and Chines/Taiwanese 
experienced highly different legal status according to their ties to two 
Korean/Chinese governments.  Although the Cold War in northeast Asia 
changed drastically since 1991 and communism is not regarded as a primary 
threat to capitalist society, arbitrariness and discretion in Japan’s immigration 
control regime has not changed. Above all, those who lost citizenship did not cry 
out in protest collectively. These facts suggest that at least another logic is 
required to explain the origin of immigration control regime besides of 
anticommunist ideology and postcolonial racism. This paper clarifies the logic 
and mechanisms of defining borderline of citizenship in postwar Japan through 
description of formation process of immigration control regime immediately 
after the Second World War.  
 
1-2 Previous studies 
Scholars of the history of immigration control policy have often discussed 
this period as the vantage point. Yasuaki Ohnuma (1979-80; 2004) reviewed the 
history of immigration control regime in Japan and pointed out the Allied 
Power’s lack of plan for decolonization as well as Japanese Government’s 
initiative in immigration control policy; he gave a detailed description on how 
immigration control regime in Japan originally targeted Koreans in Japan. On 
the other hand, Tessa Morris-Suzuki11 studied the history of Koreans in Japan, 
clarified the irregular migration from Korea and Cold War in Northeast Asia 
played crucial roles in forming the ethnic community in post-war Japan.  Her 
main argument is that the Korean War and its preceding ideological conflict in 
Korean Peninsula forced many Koreans to leave the country, and such refugees 
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who escaped to Japan seriously influenced the community of Koreans in Japan 
as well as Japan’s immigration control policy. Matthew Augustine, like 
Morris-Suzuki, studied the irregular migration from Korea to Japan and 
underlines importance of Imperial Ordinance of Alien Registration. Imperial 
Ordinance of Alien Registration as a means of suppression of irregular 
migration from Korea became the prototype of the immigration control policy in 
post-war Japan, and the imperial ordinance was a measure of “blockade Japan” 
according to BCOF12, thus a part of tactics of the Cold War in northeast Asia.  
These studies clarify, or presuppose that the post-war immigration control 
system in Japan targets mainly Koreans in Japan. Furthermore, one of the 
reasons of such targeting is irregular migration from Korea to Japan under the 
Cold War in northeast Asia, and/or such irregular migration was regarded as a 
threat in such international politics. However, there remains another 
unanswered presupposition; why and how Koreans were regarded as different 
groups from Japanese? Ohnuma described the smooth process of blanket 
deprivation of Japanese nationality of Koreans as a semblance of concordance . 
This concordance signifies the shared understandings of the borderline of 
citizenship both among Japanese and Koreans; without this understanding, 
citizenship in post-war Japan could not have been drawn. However, previous 
scholarship has not yet proved the mechanism of this concordance. In the 
following section, first I consider the mechanism that produced the semblance of 
concordance in the process of irregular migration of Koreans to Japan, and then 
analyze how the mechanism related to the postcolonial racism and 
anticommunist ideology.  
 
2. Background 
 
2-1 Military occupation of Japan 
The origin of the immigration control regime can be traced back to the 
military occupation of Japan by the Allied Powers just after Japan’s defeat in 
the Second World War. From September 1945 to April 1952, Japan experienced 
indirect occupation by the Allied Powers that had Far East Committee and 
Allied Council for Japan as the top, and mainly consisted of the Eighth Army of 
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the United States. The commander of United States Army Forces in the Far East, 
Douglas McArthur, was appointed as the position of the General 
Headquarters/Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (GHQ/SCAP), who led 
Japan’s demilitarization and democratization both substantially and 
symbolically. Besides the SCAP, United States Army Forces, Pacific (USAFPAC) 
mainly concerned local military occupation and the British commonwealth 
Occupation Forces took part in Chugoku and Shikoku Areas.  
These Occupational Forces indirectly occupied Japan; SCAP in Tokyo gave 
instructions (in the form of Memorandums, Instruction Notes) to the Japanese 
Government and the Japanese Government drafted, passed and enforced the 
instructions in the form of domestic laws. Except for the Home Ministry and 
those conflict to post-war reforms were retained so that smoothly enforce the 
reforming instructions. The Central Liaison Office worked for the negotiations 
and translation/interpretations between GHQ/SCAP and the Japanese 
Government. In local municipalities, the USAPFAC supervised and advised the 
demilitarization process and the enforcement of the reforms, as well as policing 
and censorship.  
 
2-2 Repatriations to and from Japan 
As for the immigration control, Japan lost its diplomatic independence, 
thus it was the occupational forces that led the migration control of Japan. The 
first issue that faced post-war Japan was the flows of the repatriates; from 
August 1945, six million Japanese started repatriation from ex-colonies and 
military occupied areas in mainland China, Southeast Asian countries and 
South Pacific Islands. Although the number of deaths among Japanese 
repatriates are relatively fewer than other Axis countries, notably Germany, the 
repatriation left tragedies among repatriates; war-displaced people left behind 
in China by their Japanese relatives in their infancy is one of the legacies of the 
period13. On the other hand, most of the repatriates from Japan were 
two-million Koreans and 24,000 Taiwanese, both the people from ex-colonies.  
   This repatriation is conducted in a chaotic situation. Young, single 
laborers who had come to Japan by force immediately left Japan to their 
homeland. However, those who lived in Japan for decades with their families did 
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not repatriate, at least immediately. How to exclude these former subjects of the 
Japan Empire from newly-born nation state—the main concern of the immediate 
post-war Japan lies in this point.  
 
2-3 Irregular migration from Korea to Japan 
Repatriation and immigration of Koreans were other important issues for 
the Japanese Government and the Occupation Forces. Most Koreans in Japan 
returned to their homeland as soon as Japan’s defeat was announced, and more 
than 1,300,000 people had been repatriated by March 1946. Still, about 500,000 
to 600,000 Koreans remained in Japan that spring. The Japanese Government 
and SCAP tried to repatriate them, but harsh property limits and the political, 
economic, and social turbulence in South Korea discouraged Koreans from 
returning to their homeland.  
Another related problem had to do with return migration from Korea. 
These immigrants—most of whom were trying to escape the violence associated 
with the White Terror (unjustified arrest and suppression of free speech by the 
authorities) and/or the political and social instability in their countries—were 
regarded as illegal entrants by the occupying forces and the Japanese 
Government, and thus were suppressed. According to the Ministry of Justice, 
the number apprehended and charged with illegal entry reached its peak in 
1946 (17,733), then decreased by half in 1947. It then increased again until 1949, 
and dropped after 1950 (Ministry of Justice, 1975: 87). The total number of 
apprehensions from 1946 to 1950 was 45,960. 
 
Number of detentions of illegal entrants to Japan14 
 
About ninety percent of the irregular migrants are Koreans who departed 
from ports along the southeast coast of the Korean Peninsula, such as Pusan 
Year/Place of Detention 1946 1947 1948 1949 1950 1951
Offshore 1,358 729 329 729
Place of embarkation 5,239 6,160 6,324 1,572 2,410
Domestic 771 460 1,449 553 364
Total 17,733 6,010 7,978 8,032 2,434 3,503
Escaped 3683 1,467 2,046 2,710 1,170 1,143
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and Masan, or from Cheju Island, which is located off the southwest shore of the 
Korean Peninsula. Therefore, the major routes for illegal entry ran between 
Korea’s southeast coast and Japan’s northwest coast.  
 
3. turning minority into alien 
 
3-1 the prototype of immigration control  
The Imperial Ordinance of Alien Registration was one of the solutions 
meant to address this situation by putting “troublesome” Koreans under the rule 
of the Japanese Police without recognizing their nationality and/or status as 
foreigners. The ambiguity of Koreans’ status caused problems in that the 
Japanese Government could not control the trouble caused by the Koreans, 
especially after the Chinese government recognized that the Taiwanese in 
Japan were Chinese and thus nationals of the Allied Powers. For example, the 
Central Liaison Office, the special office in the Japanese government that 
liaised with the Occupation Forces, underlines in one of its reports in 1946, 
titled Illegal Activities of Koreans, that the Koreans in Japan were involved in 
illicit activities. The office reported that “recently, [Korean’s] organized illegal 
activities have occurred repeatedly, caus[ed] significant threat among 
Japanese”15.In another report, the Central Liaison Office picked up illicit 
activities committed by the “Korean, Chinese, and Formosan” (Central Liaison 
Office 1946b) that took place in the Miyagi, Osaka, and Nagasaki Prefectures.  
As a result, the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers concluded the 
following regarding the status and treatment of the Koreans and Taiwanese 
(“Formosan-Chinese”):  
    
Reports from the authorities concerned with the enforcements of SCAP 
direction and from the appropriate Japanese agencies indicate that 
Formosan-Chinese and Koreans have been taking advantages [sic] of 
their apparently doubtful status to evade the law. This strongly indicates 
the necessity of instituting adequate, additional jurisdictional and 
judicial controls for the purpose of curbing such unlawful activities 16. 
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   The Imperial Ordinance of Alien Registration was issued on May 2, 1947. 
On the following day, the Japanese Constitution was issued; therefore, this 
ordinance was the last Imperial Ordinance in Japan. The immigration and alien 
registration policy that was announced in the Imperial Ordinance of Alien 
Registration was simple: not all aliens can enter Japan (Article 3). It also 
enacted requirements that aliens who enter and stay in Japan more than 60 
days must register in the municipalities (Article 4), the municipalities must 
keep registry books of foreigners (Article 5), aliens who change their registered 
facts must apply for a change to their registration (Article 8), and so forth. Any 
foreigners who violated the ordinance would be subject to repatriation (Article 
12).  
What made the ordinance unique was that it defined people from the 
former colonies of Japan, namely Korea and Taiwan, as aliens in application of 
this ordinance (Article 11). Onuma points out that the “Imperial Ordinance of 
Alien Registration controls Koreans and Taiwanese in Japan, who, according to 
Japanese Government, still possessed Japanese nationality, with sanction of 
forced repatriation. This ordinance was the prototype of postwar immigration 
control system that crack down on ethnic minorities in the same society”17. By 
defining Koreans and Taiwanese as aliens, the ordinance placed them under the 
power of immigration control and the possibility of forced repatriation. It also 
prepared the framework for postwar Japan’s immigration control system, wh ich 
consisted of the Alien Registration Act (issued in 1952) and the Immigration 
Control Act (issued in 1951). In other words, the basic policy of the Imperial 
Ordinance of Alien Registration on immigration and alien control were inherited 
by these two acts at the end of the occupation of Japan. 
 
3-2 identifying “Korean illegal entrants” 
I once analyzed the process of irregular migration of Koreans18 and pointed 
out as follows; Korean irregular migrants were found out as such not because 
they looked like Koreans but because they looked just unfamiliar to the local 
occupation forces, police, and the residents. Finding unfamiliar ships and 
groups of people, especially in relatively small villages, should not be difficult. 
The problem lies in the fact that such searches of unfamiliar ships and people 
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was understood to be for the control of Korean irregular migrants, and that the 
immigrants themselves believed that it was easy to determine that they were 
Korean by looking at their faces or trusting their intuition. In addition, 
regarding unfamiliar ships and people as illegal entrants is not possible without 
a preexisting concept of illegal entry. Without receiving information that illegal 
entrants are coming and without the enforcement’s emphasis on the immigrants’ 
landing, unfamiliar ships and people would not be regarded as smuggling boats 
and illegal entrants. The registration of people as Korean was intended both to 
find illegal entrants and to strengthen the connection between the concepts of 
“Korean” and “illegal entry.” The Imperial Ordinance of Illegal registration 
defined the legality of entry depending on who the entrant was, not how he or 
she entered Japan.  
 
3-3 Rhetoric of anti-communism 
Ethnic attribute of Korean and irregularity in migration did not only 
relate to each other in considering the immigrants’ judicial treatment; each 
character had something to do with anticommunist ideology. The following 
report from the 8th Army implies that being Korean, agents of Communist 
organizations and “inimical to the objectives of the occupation” are 
interchangeable.  
    
Illegal entry of Koreans is (…) entry of agents from Communist 
dominated areas and the influx of personnel who swell the membersh ip of 
certain organizations inimical to the objectives of the occupation 19.  
 
On the other hand, the document also collects oral testimonies from the 
apprehended migrants, who describe themselves as victims of the communists.  
    
“The people are caught between two fires—if they take the side of the 
police against the Communists or that of the Communists against the 
police, they are oppressed by the opposing side.” (A resident of Cheju 
Island) 
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“The communists suddenly started rioting, burning, murdering and 
looting and the police and vigilantes were not strong enough to control 
them. Every time there is a riot, young people are seized and disappear. 
Under these troubled conditions the young people cannot carry out their 
normal work.” (Statement by Ri Ji Ko, 25, Cheju Island)20 
 
Most of the migrants in this quarterly report are from Jeju island in the 
southwest of Korean Peninsula. Therefore, the “riot” and “troubled conditions” 
signify so-called Jeju 4-3 Incidents (Jeju sasam sageon), or “Jeju Uprising”.  
The Special Law for Truth Investigation about the Jeju 4·3 Incident and 
Honoring Victims (Article 2) defines the incident as “the incident causing 
civilians’ sacrifices in the process of armed conflicts and the suppression 
operations beginning March 1, 1947 to 4·3, 1948 through September 21, 1954.”  
Against the divided general election in 38 degree south of Korean Peninsula, 
South Korean Labor Party organized uprising that invited harsh counter-attack 
from the police, ultra-rightist paramilitary bodies, South Korean- and the U.S. 
armies. During seven years of conflict, unarmed villagers were often targeted by 
both sides; according to tThe Jeju 4·3 Incident Investigation Report, the 
reported number of victims is 14,028 (death of 10,715, missing of 3,171, residual 
disability of 142), more than 300 villages were damaged. Among the victims, 
10,955 people (78.1%) were killed or injured by so-called Punitive Force, 
consisted of the government, military, the police and paramilitaries, Guerrillas; 
1,764 people (12.6%) were by guerrillas. The total violence was committed 
between the Punitive Force and the Guerrillas with 86.1% and 13.9% of the 
forces respectively. The number includes the victims of children under 10 years 
old (5.8%, or 814 persons), seniors over 61 (6.1%, or 860 persons), representing 
11.9% of the total victims, and females (21.3%, or 2,985 persons). As compared 
to the situation of the damage, the rhetoric adopted by the “Korean illegal 
entrants” appears to be rather interesting; they insist themselves not as the 
agent of the communists but as the victims of the Communist, who “started 
rioting, burning, murdering and looting”. Such image obviously sticks to the 
images of the communists spread by the police, paramilitaries and the South 
Korean Government, those who killed, burned and looted the villagers.  
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The documents by the Allied Powers show multi-layered twists; it was 
anticommunism that led people to irregular migration rather than communism, 
or at least, the conflict between them. On-site reports of the irregular migration 
record the voices of the migrants who see themselves as the victims of the 
communism, which the local military quarters does not deny. Nevertheless, 
when the issue was discussed in Tokyo, the immigrants were equated with 
communist agents. Ethnic attribute of Korean and irregularity in migration did 
not only relate to each other in considering the immigrants’ judicial treatment; 
each character had something to do with anticommunist ideology.  
 
3-4 Mixture of ideology and racism 
Both BCOF and SCAP related irregular migration from Korea to Korean 
ethnic organizations and saw the biggest organization, Korean League, as a 
threat or pro-communist. In October 1948, BCOF in Ehime Prefecture release a 
document “the control of illegal migration  in Ehime Prefecture” that 
summarizes and reckons up the problems as follows;  
    
-about 500 students traveled illegally from Korea to Japan, conducted 
research about Korean ethnic organization and Koreans’ legal status in 
Japan and returned to Korea in July. 
-from 23 to 29 August, about 30-40 Koreans made three to four groups, 
stayed in hotels in Matsuyama, Ehime prefecture, then traveled to Osaka 
area with close contact to Korean League Ehime Prefecture branch.  
-Korean League actively took part in obtaining alien registration card for 
the irregular migrants and the profit was sent to North Korea and the 
USSR. Close relation between Korean League and Japan Communist 
Party/ DPRK. 
 
Already in December 1947, SCAP related to irregular migration to Korean 
League, describing as the following.  
    
This is believed that the documents [registration cards] and the money, 
had been intended for the Korean League—the documents to be 
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disseminated among the Korean people in Japan and the currency to be 
utilized by the league to further their mass communist indoctrination 
these materials are presumed to have originated in north Korea under 
auspices of the Russians21. 
 
However, Korean League did not make profit from irregular migration or 
officially helped irregular migrants. Rather, they did not get involved to 
irregular migrations or migrants as an organization, insisting that the Koreans 
who had lived in Japan before the end of the Second World War should be 
treated differently from those who migrated to Japan after the war for the first 
time, or again, from Korea. From the documents produced by the field -level 
report, the occupation forces seem to share the fact that the individual irregular 
migrant cannot be regarded as agent of communist organization. At the same 
time, occupation forces could not get rid of the doubt that ethnic organization 
took part in irregular migration. Such fear was strengthened if some irregular 
migrants depended on the support from relatives, family members and friends 
in local ethnic organization. The documents shows the confusion or connection of 
the two possibilities of the communist entry to Japan and the communist 
support of such migration.  
Such confusion and connection reflect Japan’s domestic politics. After 
land-sliding victory of the Liberal Democrat Party in January 1949, Shigeru 
Yoshida organized his third administration. The following summer saw 
nation-spread anticommunism such as Red Purge, unsolved murder cases in 
which Japan Communist Party and labor organization were alleged their  
involvement. On the other hand, the conflict between Koreans in Japan such as 
Edogawa Incident came up in gossip, spreading the image of Korean as violent 
threat to security. As the result, Korean League were forced to shut up as 
violent organization in September 1949. Irregular migration from Korea 
overlapped to the problematic status of Koreans in Japan, as well as political 
handling of the Korean League. Both issues had two things in common; they 
should be ethnically different from Japanese, and politically different from the 
allies.  
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4. Conclusion  
 
In 1991, Japanese Government abolished fingerprinting to permanent 
residents, which provoked strong antipathy both Foreigners and Japanese. 
However, in 2005, Japan introduced photos and fingerprinting at the 
immigration counters. This time it was not anti-communism but the war against 
terror that became the leading ideology of immigration control.  
This paper has analyzed the mechanisms that invent the borderline of 
citizenship in postwar Japan. In the first stage of controlling irregular 
migration from Korea, anticommunism and racism did not separate clearly. 
However, in practice, local military governments did not regard irregular 
migrants as communists; rather, the migrants tried to escape from 
politics/social instability in South Korea and the occupation forces recognized 
their situations. The migrants told their motives in accordance to 
anticommunist ideology in South Korea so that they could be treated not as 
communists but as refugees.  
Anticommunist ideology and post-colonial racism overlapped because the 
notion of irregular migration mediated the threat of communism as well as 
Korean ethnic organizations that had close but controversial ties with Japan 
Communist Party. Koreans are now different from Japanese because their 
country is liberated from Japan Empire. Without connecting anticommunism 
and the assumption that Koreans are different from Japanese, racism toward 
Koreans cannot be authorized in postwar Japan. Irregular migration from Korea 
connected all the three ideas of difference, anticommunism and racism.  
Moreover, in the light of Japan’s independence, immigration control was 
being handled by Japanese Government. Such political situation enabled 
relatively freehand to Japanese side, who eventually succeeded in including 
people from former colonies, the holders of Japanese citizenship, main targets of 
immigration control policy. 28th April 1952, people from former colonies were 
deprived of their Japanese citizenship by circular notice of Director-General of 
the Civil Affairs Bureau. The policy that originally targeted irregular migration 
from Korea turned ethnic minority groups in postwar Japan into foreigners who 
do not have citizenship.  
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Legal identification is always the result of political/social categorization. 
Observing the birth of immigration control system in Japan clarifies the 
borderline of citizenship is drawn by the contingent notion of non-nationals; 
nationhood and citizenship are different but overlapping notions, and thus made 
academic debate over citizenship controversial. In the late 1940s, Japanese 
Government and the Allied Powers tried to suppress irregular migration to 
Japan and resulted in making a part of Japanese citizens aliens without 
citizenship. Anticommunist ideology, post-colonial racism, and the basic notion 
of difference that supported Korea’s liberation from Japan paved the path.  
Almost more than 30 years of the end of the Cold War, Japan’s 
immigration control regime, especially its notorious discretion which often 
predominates basic human rights in Japanese Constitution and other 
international conventions, has not yet changed so much.  This fact implicates 
that immigration control system in Japan has its basis on monitoring migrants, 
seeing them as possible danger to Japanese society.  
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Memory on the Korean ‘compatriots’ and defining  
the boundary of the Korean national community  
 
Seung-Min Lee 
 
I. Introduction  
 
In the late 1980s, the Republic of Korea began to face the issue 
brought about by the incongruence between state, nation, and members who 
belong to it. It was the period when the coethnic compatriots, mostly 
Joseonjŏk in China and Koryoin from the former Soviet Union, and the 
Korean government became increasingly awakened to their ‘long -forgotten’ 
homeland and coethnic compatriots. This mutual recognition and the 
encounter spurred the Korean government and the society as a whole to 
embrace them within the Korean national community and rethink their 
relationships to the homeland state.  
The Kim Yong-Sam administration (1993–1998) and its emphasis on 
“globalization (segyehwa) discourse” further accelerated government 
engagement with Korean compatriots. This resulted in the “Overseas 
Korean Act” (OKA) in 1999, which targeted both Korean citizens abroad and 
ethnic Koreans of foreign citizenship. The law granted them de facto quasi-
citizenship rights, legally designating their status as “overseas Korean 
compatriots (Jaeoe dongpo),” a new form of national belonging that can best 
be described as “ethnizenship”.1 
The most significant aspect of the OKA is its definition of who should 
be included within the Korean national community. Initially, the OKA was 
established in a way that limits the inclusion of emigrants who migrated 
before the foundation of ROK in 1948, which left a large part of Joseonjŏk 
and Koryoin compatriots out of the category of “overseas Korean 
compatriots”. However, it was immediately controversial and generated 
severe backlash not only from the overseas compatriots themselves but also 
from the Korean society. In 2004, the OKA was amended, and the definition 
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of “overseas Korean compatriots” redefined, through a much -contested and 
painful process. The new, more inclusive definition included coethnic 
Koreans whose ancestors had left the Korean peninsula even before 1948.  
The process of reconfiguring national boundaries involved questioning 
and defining “who is regarded as what?” It reflects the Korean states’ 
specific view on overseas compatriots and the boundary of the Korean 
national community. In this paper, I attempt to answer the following 
questions: What was the Korean state’s view on “overseas Koreans” and 
how did it develop? How did such views influence defining the relationship 
between homeland and overseas compatriots and ultimately defining  the 
Korean nation?”  
There have been numerous studies on the Korean government’s policy 
towards overseas Korean compatriots, and it tends to accentuate the 
economic aspect of the relationship between the Korean state and overseas 
Korean communities in the context of global capitalism2. Another strand of 
study on overseas Korean compatriots sheds lights on the process of 
acculturation in their ethnic homeland, the formation of their communities 
and networks, and their identity politics which focuses on the side of co-
ethnic compatriots as an agent3. However, most studies on this new form of 
national belonging neglect to see how homeland state’s memory on specific 
national past is linked with overseas Korean compatriots, how its 
narratives have been developed and finally how it is involved in broadening 
the scope of national belonging. This is partly because it has often been 
considered that the Korean government was indifferent to them and that 
therefore no significant relationship existed between the Korean state and 
overseas compatriots until the 1990s when the government started to 
institutionalize it. However, this overly presentist approach leads to an 
ahistorical view on the making and remaking of the national boundary of 
the Korean nation which reveals an important aspect of Korean nationalism.   
This study, therefore, attempts to explore the previously neglected 
issue of national memory in the making of the Korean nation by examining 
how overseas Korean compatriots have been remembered and narrated by 
the Korean state over time, the attempt to reconnect with overseas 
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compatriots before the official institutionalization in the late 1990s, and 
finally it investigates how the views on overseas Korean compatriots are 
manifested during the process of defining “overseas Korean compatriots”.  
To explore this question, I first examine how overseas Korean 
compatriots have been remembered and narrated by the Korean state over 
time, and also the attempt to reconnect with overseas compatriots before 
the official institutionalization of the late 1990s. Finally, I investigate how 
views on overseas Korean compatriots manifested during the process of 
defining “overseas Korean compatriots”.  
 
II. Homeland Perception of ‘dongpo (compatriot)’ 
 
The last bastion of the Korean nation: The origin of ‘dongpo’  
To understand the homeland view on its diasporic people outside, it is 
important to understand the term ‘dongpo’, which clearly defines the extent 
of the Korean nation. The term includes Koreans both inside and outside 
the homeland as well as North Koreans: in other words, it denotes all 
possible members of the Korean nation.4 
Dongpo is a category used to represent the prototypical national 
community imagined to have existed in the Korean peninsula, since the 
transitional period after the collapse of Chosen dynasty, when people were 
freed from the status of subjects and were organized into the modern 
Korean nation (minzŏk). The term came into use widely and consistently 
from the 1890s without much change of the meaning 5. Going through a 
stormy transitional between the late 19 th century and the early 20th 
century, Korean dongpo started to migrate to China, Russian, Japan and 
the United States in a massive scale, and the category dongpo was divided 
into ‘haeŏe dongpo (overseas compatriots)’ and ‘Naeji dongpo (Internal 
compatriots)’. Later by the Korean War, dongpo in the peninsula was 
divided into the South and North. In this process, the term ‘haeŏe dongpo’ 
has become specifically associated with the notion of ‘historic dispers ion’, 
the situation under which people were forced to leave their homeland and 
unable to return.6  
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In the early days of migration in the late 19 th century, Koreans abroad 
were viewed as ambivalently since their cultural genuineness was often 
called into question. Also, outmigration was seen as dangerous and 
somewhat undesirable. However, this view was reversed at the beginning of 
the 20th century when Japan extended its imperial power over the Korean 
peninsula. As Japan brings the Korean peninsula under its  imperial rule, 
the migration of Koreans and the formation of diasporic communities grew 
dramatically. In a massive role reversal, now it was the overseas 
compatriots and diasporic communities that functioned as outposts of the 
independence movement, or, to borrow an expression from Schmid, 
“custodian of the nation”.7 
Schmid illustrates this shift by pointing to nationalist newspapers in 
overseas communities arguing that, out of reach of colonizing powers, 
Overseas Koreans could raise their voice against Japanese rule and gather 
forces for anti-Japanese movement, while maintaining genuine cultural 
characteristics as Koreans untainted by Japanese imperialism. Therefore, 
being away from homeland was not perceived as being severed from home, 
but more as ‘building’ home from the outside.8 This view also clearly 
appeared in the diasporic newspaper Kwoneop Shinmun in 1912 stating 
that there is no other way but to rely on haeŏe dongpo to take up the role of 
nationalist, for they are free to discuss, preach, publish,  and to spread the 
nationalist thoughts. The leaders of diasporic community were also sharing 
this view. In 1914, a Korean anonymous contributor who traveled to the 
Maritime Province of Russia, where Kwoneop Shinmun was published, 
wrote a congratulatory message to commemorate the 2nd anniversary of the 
newspaper praising and complimenting how important the diasporic 
newspapers are for the homeland where press was severely controlled, 
emphasizing the diasporic community as important locus for spreading the 
Korean nationalistic thoughts and mobilizing independent movements.  
In short, the image of and the perception toward the compatriots 
abroad (haeŏe dongpo) were tightly connected to their historic connotation 
as victims of an unfortunate fate and at the same time as outposts of the 
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independence movement and a last bastion of the Korean nation, the idea 
which transcends the territorial nation in imagining the ‘Korean nation’.  
 
Symbolic representation of Overseas Koreans 
While such views on haeŏe dongpo were commonly held throughout the 
colonial period, the making of ‘Korean citizen’ has begun with the 
establishment of the Republic of Korea in 1948, demarcating those inside 
and outside of Korea.  
During this period, the urgent issue that the government had to 
address was how to deal with Koreans in Japan, who were being severely 
marginalized and stripped of their Japanese citizenship, as well as those 
returning from diasporic communities in China, Russians’ Maritime 
Provinces, and Japan. Since it was the initial stage of settling as a nation-
state where the return migration of Koreans from diasporic communities 
was still an ongoing process, a set of policies and social discourses were 
focused on these immediate solutions for the movement of people and good s.  
Although the government was incapable of developing all -
encompassing policies for the Koreans outside the peninsula, both due to 
all-out defense against the communism under the Cold war situation and 
the lack of ‘bureaucratic infrastructural capacity’ 9as a newly-independent 
state, the Korean state’s view and perception toward their compatriots 
abroad was occasionally manifested in the presidential speeches and 
newspaper articles. On May 31 st, 1948, the chairman Syngman Rhee, in the 
opening address at the National Assembly, showed a glimpse of how ‘haeŏe 
dongpo ’ has been seen in the process of building the Korean state:  
 
“I, as a representative of this assembly, proclaim the rebirth of the 
Republic of Korea and that this National assembly is the only 
legitimate representation of our nation. The ROK was founded on the 
basis of democracy through the March 1 st independent movement by 
leaders of 13 provinces and the establishment of the Provisional 
Government. Unfortunately, we could not complete our revolutio n due 
to the international circumstances at the time; however, our patriotic 
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men and women both inside and outside the peninsula have supported 
our [provisional] government and devoted their lives to defend this 
spirit. Therefore, the National Assembly that we are holding today is 
the succession of the March 1 st movement, and the government we are 
setting up today through this assembly is the succession and revival of 
the provisional government which represents the entire Korean people .” 
(Opening address of the National Assembly 1948)10 
 
In his speech, Rhee, then the chairman of the assembly and later the 
President, addresses all Koreans—both on and off the peninsula—as the 
foundation of the nation and as legitimate members of the ROK, 
acknowledging their national liberation movement as a primary force of the 
state-building.  
   This perception of overseas Koreans as the nation’s supporters were 
reinforced as diasporic communities, particularly in Japan and the United 
States, continued to send relief funds and goods to their war-torn homeland. 
Expressions of gratitude frequently appeared in the major newspapers and 
presidential addresses throughout the 1950s and continued well into the 
1960s. For example, the 1953 National Assembly meeting discussed the 
issue of a congratulatory message to the diasporic community in Hawaii to 
commemorate the 50 th anniversary of their migration. During the assembly, 
members agreed that, despite the fact that the ROK was currently at war, 
the Korean government should not forget to commemorate the anniversary 
in order to remember the Korean compatriots as a cradle of the 
independence movement. Eventually, the commemoration of the 50 th 
anniversary led to the establishment of In-ha (Incheon-Hawaii) University, 
founded in honor of emigrants’ first departure from Incheon and their 
constant independence movement for the homeland (June 4, 1953, “On the 
establishment of Inha University” Syngman Rhee’s presidential speech)11, 
which epitomizes the view of the Korean state toward their overseas 
Korean community. Moreover, the annual address of March 1 st 
independence movement and the New Year’s address of major media press 
continuously elaborated the national independence and nation-building 
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history in connection with overseas compatriots. In March 1 st 1953, an 
article commemorating the history of Independence struggle appeared in 
the KyungHyang Shinmun.12 In the article, the history of national struggle 
for independence was elaborated in connection with overseas compatriots’ 
movement in China, Russia, and the US, explaining how the nationalist 
leaders of each diasporic community have been working toward the 
independence clandestinely. Listing numbers of nationalist leaders, such as 
Syngman Rhee, Changho Ahn, Kwang-Soo Lee and many more, and also 
their secretive transnational activities, the article placed overseas Korean 
compatriots at the front and center of Korean nation commemorating their 
struggle for the liberation of homeland from each of their diasporic 
community.  
In this way, in the mid-20th century the Korean government continued 
to represent overseas compatriots symbolically, if not institutionally, 
recognizing the past and present role as  nation-builders and supporters of 
the homeland. However, it was not until the 1970s that the government 
began to more broadly recognize overseas Korean compatriots, bringing 
their past into the forefront of the narrative surrounding them.  
 
The rise of memory 
As early as the end of the 1960s, Korean society gradually started to 
become aware of Korean compatriots in China and Russia who remained 
and were detained under the communist regimes. These groups gradually 
became more visible throughout the 1970s. As the issue of repatriation of 
Koreans in Sakhalin arises, President Park Chung-Hee began to mention 
the Korean compatriots in the communist states and his view is well 
manifested in his New Year’s address in 1968:  
 
It is deeply deplorable that our 12mill ion compatriots in the North are 
still living under slave-like conditions in the communist puppet regime 
and that they cannot share the joy of new morning with our brethren in 
the Republic of Korea. Moreover, I cannot help but feel indignation 
when I think of our Korean compatriots who had to leave their 
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homeland during our nation’s past time of tribulation and who are now 
detained in Manchuria, Siberia and Sakhalin under the communist 
regime living as stateless people (January 1 st , 1968, “A message to 
Korean compatriots in North Korea and the communist states,” 
President Park Chung-Hee).13  
 
As Korean compatriots in the communist states became more 
recognized, memories of migration history connected with the nation’s  past 
predicaments and their image as national victims started to fill up the 
socio-cultural landscape. This was furthered by the Far East Broadcasting 
Company (FEBC) and Korean Broadcasting System (KBS) broadcasts of 
shortwave radio programs targeting Korean compatriots in this region from 
the 1970s to the 1990s. Through the radio programs, numerous Koreans in 
the region started to send letters in an attempt to find and reconnect with 
their families and relatives in Korea. Over time, major newspapers and 
other media highlighted this project as well, thus increasing social 
recognition of the national past associated with Korean compatriots abroad.  
   In such a way, the 1970s marked a time of broadening memory 
regarding Korean compatriots abroad. Korea gradually engaged with 
hitherto unnoticed groups like Koreans in China and Russia and even in 
Japan, where Korean compatriots were often affiliated with the Chosen 
Soren (pro-North Korean association), particularly by initiating “Visiting 
Homeland Program” that brought hundreds of thousands of Korean 
compatriots to their homeland.  
   The gradual appearance of the Korean compatriots in the public eye 
and the broader recognition by the government virtually led to the rise of 
memories and created the terrain of memory throughout the 1980s. 
Particularly, as Perestroika policy in the Soviet Union opens a door for 
freedom of the press, the history of deportation  of Koreans from the 
Maritime province to the Central Asian region by Stalin in 1937 was 
excavated and introduced into the Korean society, igniting heated 
discussion on the migration history and Korea’s national past. The media 
presented the issue as one of the most tragic events in Korean history, in 
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many cases comparing it to Jews under Nazi Germany. 14 Coupled with the 
nations’ tragic past, the Korean compatriots in the communist states were 
symbolized as the victimized nation, and the history of dispersi on, 
deportation, and detainment was narrated rather sympathetically, stirring 
up the ethnonational sentiments in the sociopolitical realm.  
Throughout the process of modern state-building and its consolidation, 
Korean compatriots abroad and the diasporic communities have primarily 
been perceived as outposts of the independence movement and supporters of 
the new nation. Such a portrayer is strongly connected to Korea’s national 
memory of liberation and foundation. However, over time Korean 
compatriots also became understood as victims of the nation, which the 
government holds a sense of duty toward them. While it was expressed 
symbolically through president addresses, media representation, social 
discourses and also the call to establish the “Overseas Koreans  Day” to 
commemorate the migration of Korean compatriots, the rise of memory in 
the 1980s provided the foundation for bringing the issue of national 
belonging into the institutional realm.  
 
III. How memory shapes national belonging 
 
Korean compatriots in Sakhalin: The return of the “victimized nation”  
One of the most visible examples of the increased role of memory in 
the institutional approach toward Korean compatriots was the March 1989 
resolution for the ‘Visit and return of Korean compatriots in Sakhal in to 
their homeland’. With the approval of the Soviet Union in June 1989, 
Korean compatriots permanently returned to their homeland for the first 
time, and in the same year, the first official ‘Visit homeland program’ 
invited 23 compatriots.15  
The return of Korean compatriots from Sakhalin was continued under 
the ‘permanent return program’ overseen by the Red Cross in Korea and 
Japan with the agreement of both governments. The program is primarily 
directed at the first generation of Korean compatriots born in Sakhalin 
before August 15 th of 1945, the day of liberation, including those who were 
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already residing there by that time. The program included them regardless 
of their nationality (except for DPRK nationality). Because these people 
spent four decades—the majority of their lives—as forced laborers under 
Japanese imperial rule and later as detainees under the communist region, 
the program is meant to make reparations for their suffering as victims of 
this tragic history. Since most are elderly people who hope to spend the rest 
of their life in their homeland, the Korean government provided measures 
to help their settlement, from a special procedure to reinstate their Korean 
nationality to the support fund for housing and living expenses. Throughout 
this process of bringing the victimized nation back to their homeland, their 
history of migration and the tragic past has often surfaced through 
documentary, TV dramas, and media which also helped attracting public 
eye and support from civil society as well.   
 
Descendants of national heroes and patriots  
Another instance of how national memory on the past has influenced 
defining the national belonging is the extension of citizenship rights to 
overseas Koreans and their descendants. Particularly, the descendants of 
the Korean Chinese compatriots have benefitted from recognition as 
descendants of national heroes who fought for Korean independence during 
the colonial period. Even before the establishment of diplomatic relations 
with China in 1992, at which point Chinese citizens began to enter Korean 
on a large scale, the Korean government granted Korean Chinese 
compatriots the right to permanent return and the restoration of Korean 
nationality if their ancestors are verified by the Ministry of Patriots and 
Veterans Affairs as national heroes and patriots who fought for national 
independence. In other words, purely based on their ancestors past linked 
with the national memory, the government has extended a set of rights to 
Korean Chinese compatriots irrespective of their citizenship. This program 
has brought thousands of Korean Chinese compatriots into the Korean state 
as legitimate members of Korean national community and the ROK.  
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The revision of ‘Overseas Korean Act’: Memory as a strong appeal to 
shaping the national boundary 
The most striking example of how memory defines national belonging 
is the 2004 revision of the OKA, described briefly in the Introduction. The 
OKA, the first comprehensive policy regarding Korean compatriots abroad, 
was initially enacted in 1999 amid growing interest toward overseas Korean 
compatriots. It guaranteed overseas Koreans “quasi-citizenship rights”16 
and offered them the opportunity to work and engage in various economic 
activities while staying in the country almost indefinitely. The act also 
granted Korean compatriots property ownership by granting special status 
as ‘Jaeŏe dongpo ’. The act was seen as an innovative legal measure that 
guaranteed Korean compatriots almost the same level of rights and benefits 
as Korean nationals in Korea enjoy. However, controversy emerged over the 
definition of an “overseas Korean.”  
According to the Act, overseas Koreans can be divided into two groups; 
Jaeoe Kungmin (Korean nationals residing abroad) and Oegukkukchŏk 
dongpo (ethnic Koreans of foreign citizenship). Since Korean nationals 
abroad are the citizen of the ROK, it falls under the realm of national 
sovereignty to entitle them with the rights and privileges. The controversy, 
however, regarded the definition of the latter group, ethnic Koreans of 
foreign citizenship. The original OKA stipulated its definition as follows:  
 
Article 2 (Definitions)17 
The term “overseas Korean” in this Act means a person who falls 
under any of the following subparagraphs:  
(1) A national of the Republic of Korea who has acquired the right 
of permanent residence in a foreign country or is residing in a 
foreign country with a view to living there permanently; and  
(2) A person prescribed by Presidential Decree from among those 
who, having held the nationality of the Republic of Korea or as 
their lineal descendants, have acquired the nationality of a foreig n 
country.  
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The second clause of the above means that if a person of ethnic 
Korean with foreign nationality is to be eligible for the quasi -citizen status 
as Jaeŏe dongpo, he or she has to have a “legal” relation with the Republic 
of Korea, which was founded in 1948. Here, controversy arises over the 
inclusion of this date as criteria for defining Jaeŏe dongpo: the Korean 
nationality did not exist until the establishment of the ROK in 1948, thus a 
significant proportion of emigrants during the late Chosen era or Japanese 
colonial period were automatically excluded because they were unable to 
officially prove their legal relationship with the ROK. This excluded the 
majority of ethnic Koreans in China and the Central Asian states, more 
than half of overseas Koreans today.  
There was an immediate reaction to this definition as soon as the OKA 
was promulgated. It aroused strong opposition not only from Joseonjŏk 
dongpo and Koryoin dongpo community, but also from the Korean society, 
including activists, academics, and the media. Numerous groups held public 
hearings and press conferences, issued statements, and staged protests to 
call for the revision of OKA.  
Amid escalating tension and ongoing debates, the politicization of the 
issue culminated in the constitutional appeal of three Korean Chinese. With 
the support of civil societies, they petitioned the Constitutional Court to 
review the OKA. In November 2001, the Constitutional Court determined 
that excluding these ethnic Koreans in China and Russia from the Jaeŏe 
dongpo category, thereby excluding them from being legitimate 
beneficiaries of the quasi-citizenship status, does not agree with ROK’s 
principle of equality. They ordered that the law be revised by the end of 
2003.  
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Table 1: OKA definition of “overseas Korean” before and after the revision 
Pre-Revision Post-Revision
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Article 2 
The term “overseas Korean” in this Act 
means a person who falls under any of 
the following subparagraphs:  
(1) A national of the Republic of Korea 
who has acquired the right of permanent 
residence in a foreign country or is 
residing in a foreign country with a 
view to living there permanently; and  
(2) A person prescribed by Presidential 
Decree from among those who, having 
held the nationality of Republic of 
Korea or as their lineal descendants, 
have acquired the nationality of a 
foreign country.  
Article 2 
The term “overseas Korean” in this Act 
means a person who falls under any of the 
following subparagraphs:  <Amended by 
Act No. 7173, Mar. 5, 2004> 
(1) A national of the Republic of Korea 
who obtains the right of permanent 
residence in a foreign country or is 
residing in a foreign country with a view 
to living permanently there (hereinafter 
referred to as a “Korean national residing 
abroad”); and 
(2) A person prescribed by the Presidential 
Decree of those who have held the 
nationality of the Republic of Korea 
(including Koreans who had emigrated to 
foreign countries before the Government of 
the Republic of Korea was established) or 
of their lineal descendants, who obtains 
the nationality of a foreign country 
(hereinafter referred to as a “Korean with 
a foreign nationality”). 
 <Subparagraph 2 above is amended by Act 
No. 7173, on March 5, 2004, pursuant to 
the decision of its inconformity with the 
Constitution which is made by the 
Constitutional Court on November 29, 
2001> 
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Here, the justification taken by the Court should be given careful 
consideration, which corresponds with the resentful arguments raised not 
only by three petitioners but also by those of the broader  Joseonjŏk and 
Koryoin dongpo community.  
 
(C) As we have seen previously (Section 4(A)(3)), ethnic Koreans 
who emigrated before the establishment of the Korean 
Government are excluded and denied the privileges under  the Act 
not because the State adopted the "Past Nationality Principle" 
from the beginning.  The State adopted the "Past Nationality 
Principle", a somewhat neutral term, in the Overseas Korean Act 
in defining ethnic Koreans with foreign nationalities, whil e 
through the Enforcement Decree, requiring those ethnic Koreans 
who emigrated before the establishment of the Korean 
Government, mostly ethnic Koreans living in China or the former 
Soviet Union who were forced to leave their motherland to join 
the independence movement, or to avoid military conscription or 
forced labor by the Japanese imperialist force, to prove that they 
were explicitly recognized as Korean nationals before obtaining 
foreign citizenship, thereby making it virtually impossible for 
these ethnic Koreans to receive benefits bestowed under the 
Act.  Legislation of an act discriminating ethnic Koreans who 
were involuntarily displaced due to historical turmoil sweeping 
over the Korean peninsula cannot be justified from a 
humanitarian perspective, let alone from a national perspective, 
in the sense that no country on earth has legislated an act to 
discriminate against such compatriots, when it seems only 
appropriate to assist them.19  
 
This view coincides with the strong arguments of the excluded 
Joseonjŏk and Koryoin communities that the cause of emigration was not 
derived from the goal of individual prosperity but rather from the tragic 
fate of the homeland under the colonial rule. Indeed, those who fled to 
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Manchuria and Russia’s maritime province often became fervent 
independence fighters for their own nation. Such a view presents their 
connectedness to their homeland as a constitutive and constructive part of 
the nation. 
In this case, the memory of the historical predicament that led people 
to reluctantly leave their homeland drove the appeal and compelled the 
Court to recognize the petitioners as part of the Korean national 
community. Although nation-state is a legal term, this case shows that the 
politics of belonging or the readjustment of national boundary is, in many 
cases, also influenced and shaped by the national memory and certain 
historical perception attached to its people.  
 
IV. Conclusion 
 
Korea serves as an intriguing example of the interactions between 
nation, state, and memory. At each historical juncture, the ROK has shown 
its understanding of the boundaries of ethnonational community vis-à-vis 
political community and the role of the memory in it.  
As a ‘stateless’ nation under Japanese colonial rule, Korean 
compatriots abroad were seen as hope to restore its sovereignty, and even 
as a true Korean nation, the idea which transcends the territorial notion in 
imagining the ‘Korean nation’. The development of the perception toward 
the Korean compatriots abroad has been attached to the national memory of 
the tragic history and of the independence movement which generated 
strong images of ‘nation-builder’ or ‘nation’s supporter’ and also the victims 
of the unfortunate fate of homeland. With the rise of memory throughout 
the 1980s and up to the 1990s, the national memory linked with its 
compatriots abroad has led to the broadening of the national community 
through the new form of national belonging. A series of cases above 
demonstrate how strongly the memory can influence defining the nation 
and the belonging to it. The memory politics does not end with these three 
cases. In fact, the role of memory in making and remaking of the national 
boundary can still be found in the process of the recent extension of the 
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Jaeŏe dongpo category up to 4th generation Koryoin. In the commemoration 
of the 80 th year of deportation of Koryoin in 2017, again the memory on 
their tragic as well as heroic past began to emerge from the political arena 
as well as the social organizations, arousing the awareness of 4 th 
generation membership issue. With a strong appeal of the national memory 
linked with Koryoin, eventually, the enforcement ordinance of the Overseas 
Korean Act was revised to extend the Jaeŏe dongpo category up to the 4th 
generation Koryoin in 2019, the year of the centenary commemoration for 
the establishment of the Provisional Government of the Republic of Korea.  
This study is an attempt to highlight the important aspect of memory 
in the politics of national membership to overcome the limits of existing 
discourses on the OKA and the national belonging in the Korean state 
which tend to accentuate the economic motivation of the state by taking the 
1990s as the point of observation, and to overcome the tendency of 
criticizing the policy for not going far enough without even touching upon 
the essential issue of a sense of duty that the ROK holds for its compatriots 
abroad.   
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History, “Christian Nationalism,” and 
 Neoliberal Politics in Hungary 
 
Yudai Anegawa 
    
   The purpose of this paper is to place memory politics, especially based 
upon their “European” characteristics, in the context of political development 
amid European universalism (liberal values) and citizenship in contemporary 
Hungary. I use the term “politics of citizenship” to refer to politics concerned 
with inclusion and exclusion as related to a community in which equal social 
rights are legally and institutionally guaranteed, or, alternatively, as politics 
against “the others.” As Hungarian political scientist András Bozóki pointed out, 
“populist and ethno-nationalist rhetoric overshadow the ongoing neoliberal 
economic policy processes.”  1  Thus, we will eventually deal with memory 
politics in relation to neoliberal policies. 
 
１．Citizenship Policies of Viktor Orbán's Government 
    
Remarkable features of citizenship policies in Hungary since 2010 can be 
found in two different but inseparable areas: policies regarding welfare and 
refugees. The welfare policies of the Hungarian government have widened the 
economic gap between the “poor” and the strata above them. For example, the 
government has reduced the standards for and the eligible terms of 
unemployment benefits, but also introduced a flat tax system. Further, the 
government either physically excludes the homeless from public spaces and 
imprisons them. Zsuzsa Ferge, a Hungarian sociologist, points out that Hungary 
“became the first state in Europe that punished the poor by means of police 
violence and imprisonment, owing only to their poverty.”  2 The poor in Hungary 
currently not only continue to become poorer, but are also treated as if they are 
criminals. 
   There is a rumor among the Hungarian public that the poor or homeless 
receive welfare illegally or, more directly, they are making their living by 
stealing from others. Prime Minister Viktor Orbán and his government 
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propagate this rumor, asserting that those who depend on welfare benefits have 
no will to work and are immoral criminals, stealing the national resources that 
belong to “normal Hungarians.”3 The poor are excluded from the community of 
citizens who have legitimate rights to welfare receipt. In fact, a Hungarian 
sociologist Dorottya Szikra points out, through the “workfare” policies of 
Orbán’s government, “citizens are entitled to social rights only if they fulfill  
their work responsibilities,” and “the ‘idle poor’ are increasingly deprived from 
social rights to any financial assistance.”4 The labels of “criminal” and “idle” 
have been used to justify and hide racism, most notably directed towards Roma 
people. All the poor, including the Roma, are excluded as racial “others” and 
immoral criminals. 
   We can place Hungarian refugee policies since 2015 in the context of these 
kinds of politics. The government justifies its construction of border fences and 
its refusal to comply with refugee quotas as “defending European Christianity” 
against “the “most Muslim” refugees,”5 and this kind “of the rhetoric of the 
crisis relates Roma to migrants.”6 Through its “National Consultation” on the 
refugee policy and subsequent official announcement, Orbán and his cabinet 
labeled refugees as illegal immigrants, suggesting that they waste national 
property properly intended for Hungarian families and children. Islamophobia 
and related racism is veiled behind the pretext of countermeasures against 
crimes, and refugees, as with Roma or the homeless, are categorized as immoral 
criminals.7 Orbán and his government oppose Western criticism, regarding it as 
an interference by “moral imperialism.”  
   In short, we can understand Hungarian politics toward refugees, the poor 
and Roma, using such dichotomy as “Christian Europe” and “Hungarian 
traditional families and children” on the one side, and racial “others” cast as 
criminals, European universalism, and global capitalism on the other. We can 
comprehend the significance of the Constitutional Amendment (the 2011 
Fundamental Law of Hungary) in this context. Western politicians, jurists and 
intellectuals note that the regime of Fundamental Law and related legislations 
weakens the idea of social rights, gives precedence to Christian traditional 
values over the wills of individuals (making it possible to govern the country on 
the grounds of national moral, tradition, and culture), limits freedom of the 
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press, and weakens independent judicial power. 8  In short, this Hungarian 
Fundamental Law regime challenges the liberal social values of European 
universalism.  
 
２．The Fundamental Law of Hungary and Memory Politics 
 
These characteristics of the Fundamental Law regime (the Law) are 
closely connected with the regime’s view of national history. We can discern 
three key elements of Hungary’s official history: 1) The belief of the Holy Crown 
as a symbol of a Christian Kingdom; 2) That the Trianon Treaty is the center of 
national tragedy; and 3) there occurred two totalitarianism occupations. First, 
the Fundamental Law refers to the Holy Crown as “embod[ying] the 
constitutional continuity of Hungary's statehood and the unity of the nation,” 
establishing the “Hungarian State” as having been “built” by “Saint Stephen” 
(the 1st king of Arpad dynasty), and signifying “the role of Christianity in 
preserving nationhood.” Notably, the Law rejects such words as “constitution” 
and “republic,” which would reflect the people's will and acknowledge 
revolutions in Hungary’s history. The Law suggests that the Hungarian 
nation-state is constructed on neither the notion of individual people nor even of 
a community of citizens, but rather, on the tradition of the millennium Christian 
kingdom embodied by the Holy Crown, which had defended Europe from foreign 
assaults. 
   Second, as the Holy Crown idea includes a concept of the Kingdom as a 
sustained entity, it became a theoretical core for territorial revisionism after 
WWI and the signing of the Trianon Treaty. If the existence and continuity of the 
kingdom were a presupposed formulation required for national justice, the 
Trianon Treaty and the countries associated thereto would have been defined  as 
evil. According to the “Christian nation” idea that grounded interbellum 
Hungarian irredentism, the nation had a unique tradition of defending 
Christian civilization against the “uncivilized East,” in which its “middle class” 
(an amalgam of the nobility and bourgeois) had played major roles. However, not 
only was the “uncivilized East” seen as an enemy, but also included in this 
definition were western universalist/liberal powers that divided the kingdom, 
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the philosophy of communism, and also Jewish people in the country, seen as 
agents of both western and eastern enemies.9  Though very few Hungarians 
today believe in the real possibility of irredentism, some phrases in the Law may 
evoke a suspicion of Hungarian irredentist ambition among neighboring nat ions. 
The phrases include reference to “the Carpatian Basin,” the state’s 
“responsibility for the fate of Hungarians living beyond its borders,” and the 
nation’s role to “support the preservation of Hungarian identity and collective 
rights among them.” Orbán’s cabinet addressed the policy of 
nationality/citizenship for co-patriots beyond the state’s borders as its first 
mandate soon after taking power. When the citizenship law was amended, 
right-wing “political parties legitimized the law as a measure that would ‘heal 
spiritual Trianon.’”  10 
Third, policies similar to those in the interwar period must be explained 
and justified somehow, and one manner is through manipulation of the past. The 
most obvious example is the Memorial for the Victims of the German Invasion, 
which many people consider to be camouflage for past crimes, including the 
Holocaust, engaged in by the Hungarian nation from the interbellum to WWII, 
because the Memorial suggests the representation of Germans as evil and 
Hungarians as innocent. 11  In addition, the government restored street and 
place names in use before the 1944 German occupation and communist regime. 
For the current government, therefore, Hungary’s racist policies enacted during 
the interwar period should be revisited. The Law declares that the years from 
1944, when Hungary lost its sovereignty, to 1990, when it regained it, was an 
exceptional age for Hungary. The acquittal of Hungary’s interbellum regime is 
firmly connected with its identification with fascism and communism. 
   This kind of official state-sponsored “understanding” of the past, 
consisting of three different but inseparable elements, affected policy -makers 
even before Orbán’s ascension to power in 2010, especially in the period of the 
first Orbán’s government from 1998 to 2002. The Status Law in 2001 served as a 
prehistory for the current nationality/citizenship policy. At the Millennium of 
the Hungarian Kingdom in 2000, the Holy Crown of Hungary was relocated from 
the Hungarian National Museum to the Hungarian Parliament building, which 
altered its significance from “cultural property” to “political symbol for the 
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state.”12 The House of Terror Museum opened in 2002, exhibiting the stories of 
the “Two Occupations (by the totalitarian powers),” the concept which makes the 
interbellum Hungarian history innocent. 13  We should examine the further 
development of history politics in the last decade so that we can understand the 
connection between memory and citizenship politics more clearly.  
 
３．Anti-Neoliberalism and a History of “Internal Enemies” 
    
   Both the politics of citizenship and the politics of history of Orbán's 
government are closely related to anti-neoliberal politics. Hungary’s regime 
change in 1989 and its accession to the European Union (EU) in 2004 were steps  
towards neo-liberalization. In particular, leftist governments (i.e., the Socialist 
Party and Liberal Democrat League) were eager to carry out marketization and 
privatization of Hungary’s economy and reduce its state budgets. Their 
neo-liberal policies included the reduction of welfare budgets and the 
introduction of partial privatization of pension funds, greatly impacting the 
middle class. Orbán was able to succeed in the 2010 general election primarily 
due to his criticism of these neo-liberal policies. Bozóki pointed out that “middle 
class populism jockeyed around hand-in-hand with the exclusion of lower classes 
and the unemployed from the nation.”14 Orbán’s government’s policies toward 
the poor have been intimately connected with policies that favor the  middle 
class, such as improved supports for families with children and the shift of the 
welfare system from benefit-based to tax deduction-based. As Szikra points out, 
there has occurred a “redistribution from poor to rich families.” 15 
The neo-liberal policies of the previous leftist governments (before 2010) 
were closely associated with Hungary’s  accession to the EU. Based on 
recommendations from both the IMF and the World Bank, the EU requires 
candidate countries to introduce not a European, but an American system of 
welfare.16 Hungary’s accession was legitimized by the retrospective narrative 
that it had traditionally developed European-oriented reforms and achieved 
progress, which would culminate in its joining the EU. Hungarian history, from 
the building of the Kingdom by St. Stephen the First, through Imre Nagy in 
1956, the Kadar Era, and especially including the regime transition in 1989 and 
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subsequent EU accession, can be explained through this kind of narrative. The 
Socialist Party could regard itself as a successor of a reform-oriented political 
power, i.e. social democrats, since the 1980’s in this framework 17. This is how 
the left connected “Hungarian nation” and “European -ness.” 
Orbán's government has devised another kind of historical narrative, 
developing its original ideas based on the concept of being a “Christian nation,” 
which is used to seemingly exclude elements such as the poor, Roma people, the 
European Union, European liberal universalism, “reform and progress” 
Social-Democrats, and Neo-liberalism from Hungary’s national identity. He 
emphasizes the historical formulation that Hungarians have always been 
threatened by the risk of “internal enemies” and “traitors” acting as the agents 
of western liberals and the communist Soviet Union. The regime change in 1989 
is also considered to have been a result of Socialist betrayal of the Hungarian 
people’s expectations. Those “internal enemies” (i.e., Soviet agents) who had 
deprived the nation of its private properties by way of “nationalization” in the 
past, have been turned into “red capitalists,” privatizing the national properties 
today as if they are agents of the EU, IMF, or global capitalism.18 From this 
right-wing viewpoint, liberal parties and intellectuals who criticize the 
government and protest the labeling of refugees, Roma and the poor as 
“criminals,” are in turn labeled “traitors” as well as “former communists.” They 
are convinced that the Central European University is an agent of George Soros, 
a symbol of global capitalism and a “supporter” of the refugees who “invade” 
Hungary. Obviously, the politics that fabricated “internal enemies” and assault 
them as political targets are closely associated with racism. This is the very 
junction at which memory politics and citizenship policies converge. 
 
４．Conclusion 
 
In conclusion, we have examined the role played by the narratives, 
produced in the last decade, of Hungarian national history, along with 
citizenship politics in Hungary. These narratives were made for/along criticism 
against neoliberal policies that have seriously impacted the country’s middle 
classes. At the same time, however, they are combined with Orbán's neoliberal 
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politics in which the redistribution from the poor to the rich is justified by 
criminalizing and racializing the poor and the “others.” In  other words, memory 
politics in Hungary have played a decisive role in legitimizing the critical but 
contradictory attitudes toward neoliberalism. 
   Interestingly enough, not only historical narratives, but also recent 
citizenship politics in contemporary Hungary, share common features with those 
in the interwar period. At that time, morality on the ground of the normative 
family image and the ethics of labor was identified as the basis for “usefulness” 
and “security” in civil society: the poor were classified, hierarchically arranged, 
and excluded on the ground of this standard. The government also promoted the 
principle of “work instead of welfare,” while at the same time also connecting 
these policies to its racist and anti-Semitic policies. This similar connection of 
the history and citizenship politics in these two periods suggests that we should 
study memory politics not as an independent topic, but as an aspect of politics 
regarding inclusion and exclusion in civil society as well as at national leve ls. 
We must of course be thoughtful, and not exaggerate continuity or recurrence. 
However, I think that our attention to such connections will enrich the 
comparative studies of memory politics. 
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Citizenship and Memory in Eastern Europe and East Asia: 
A Comparison 
 
Carol Gluck 
 
This group of papers underlines the importance of moving outside our 
respective national or regional contexts to understand the commonalities in the 
formation and maintenance of public memory. First, let me point out the 
striking commonalities in contemporary memories of the Second World War in  
East Asia and Eastern Europe. These commonalities emerged clearly in the 
years after the end of the Cold War, when a combination of geopolitical and 
domestic change unleashed new waves of war memory in both regions. The 
renewed memory surges followed decades of what in Eastern Europe might be 
called “national memories postponed,” similar to what I see as Japan’s “war 
memory finally unfrozen.”   
   Under the Cold War framework – Japan dominated by the United States, 
East and Central Europe by the Soviet Union – the nations’ war narratives 
were not entirely of their own making. The Soviet version of the anti-fascist 
narrative even (and ironically) included East Germany in an allegedly united 
struggle against Nazism, omitting such episodes as wartime Soviet occupations, 
the Holocaust by bullets, and other war experiences. Japan was heir to the 
Pacific War narrative created by the United States, which ran from Pearl 
Harbor to Hiroshima, thus excluding the China War, which began in 1937 and 
was the reason for the attack on Pearl Harbor in the first place.  
Liberated from the Cold War narratives in the 1990s, Eastern European 
nations returned to the 1940s and told the story of the war over again, but in 
their own terms, with the added perspective of the postwar decades of Soviet 
domination. The evocation of double occupation by Nazis and Soviets – and in 
the Baltics “triple occupation” by Soviets, Nazis, and Soviets again – 
emphasized both the Soviet and Nazi depredations of national independence.  
In Hungary and elsewhere, the new national narratives collapsed Nazi wartime 
actions with postwar communist rule. And the nationalistic tenor of these 
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narratives created geopolitical contention between Russia and Poland, Russia 
and the Baltics, Germany and the Czech Republic, Russia and Ukraine, and so 
on. The new geopolitics of war memory fed the heated hostility around the 
anniversaries of the end of the war in 1995, 2005, and 2015. In contrast with 
Western Europe, which by 1995 had come to enough of a consensus about the 
war that French, German, and other leaders  could stand together on the same 
dais, the political choreography in Eastern Europe proved difficult  in regard to 
which statesmen would be invited, or accept an invitation, to which national 
commemorations. From the Baltics to the Balkans war memory was central in 
the reframing of national history for the sake of national unity, national 
identity, and national stature, with ongoing international repercussions.  
   The same was true in East Asia.  After the end of the Cold War, Chinese 
and South Koreans called on Japan to confront its wartime actions in Asia, so 
long absent from the U.S. sponsored narrative of the Pacific War. Japanese 
faced one memory issue after another: the so-“comfort women,” former sex 
slaves of the Japanese imperial army; the Nanjing Massacre; thirty-five years 
of oppressive colonial rule in Korea. A change in the name of the conflict to the 
Asia-Pacific War finally acknowledged the importance of Japanese aggression 
on the continent.  But the politics of war memory only grew more heated with 
the years, as the war figured centrally in the nationalistic refiguring of 
national histories in each country, creating similar geopolitical tensions as in 
Eastern Europe. From demands for apology and compensation to victims to 
territorial claims over disputed islands, war memory continues to cloud 
relations between Japan and its neighboring countries. This commonality 
explains why some say that in East Asia and Eastern Europe, the postwar 
period truly began only in the 1990s. 
That said, I agree with the previous comment that memory politics and 
the politics of citizenship in both East Asia and Eastern Europe are driven first 
and foremost by domestic political and economic factors in the context of a 
uncertain post-Cold-War international order. This combination helps to explain 
Xi Jinping in China, Abe Shinzō in Japan, Viktor Orban in Hungary,  Law and 
Justice in Poland, Putin in Russia and others. And despite the vast differences 
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among these societies, I think it important to note the commonalities as we 
make comparative connections. 
   My second point has to do with citizenship and nationality, concerning, for 
example, the way these words are used differently in these papers. The term 
“citizenship” now includes a multiplicity of meanings. Nineteenth-century 
ideas of citizenship aligned citizenship with nationality. The imperatives of the 
modern nation-state in its nineteenth-century form demanded that citizens had 
to know and identify themselves as French, Danish, or Japanese nationals, 
speak a single national language, learn in national schools, and the rest. This 
was ethnic only in the sense that an identity was imputed to the people as a 
whole, for citizenship was in essence national. After World War I, ethnicization 
drove the policy of national self-determination and population exchanges: the 
Greeks out of Turkey to Greece; the Turks out of Greece to Turkey, and the like.  
This is also the background for Sara Park’s paper on “ideology or racism” in 
postwar Japanese immigration controls, which were indeed about ethnici ty, 
distinguishing, deporting, and discriminating against Koreans and Chinese in 
the process of creating the new postwar myth of  Japanese social homogeneity.  
One might see this as a transformation from the nation-state to the ethnic 
nation. Seung-Min Lee has suggested a nice term for this: ethnicizenship, 
which melds ethnicity and citizenship.   
   After the Second World War the deportation of Koreans, including those 
born in Japan as well as the repatriation of Japanese from Korea, was carried 
out under the aegis of the U.S. occupation authorities, and this was before the 
onset of anti-communist policies. Indeed, the Americans seem to have felt more 
strongly about the ethnic nation than did the Japanese, at least in the 
beginning. Of course, Japanese found the idea congenial, since they had long 
discriminated against Koreans. Nonetheless, it was the Americans who 
determined that only Japanese should live in the home islands and only 
Koreans in the Korean peninsula. The occupation even returned Okinawans 
from the mainland to Okinawa, despite the fact that Okinawa was an integral 
part of the Japanese empire and that many of those returned  had never set 
foot on Okinawa. Twelve million ethnic Germans were expelled from Eastern 
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Europe after the war, and after independence, the Algerian French returned to 
France. Many such examples make clear how strong the idea of the ethnic 
nation had become by the late twentieth century. 
   Another phase that began during the same decades saw a growing 
emphasis on citizenship beyond borders. Germany had long made a legal link 
between citizenship and being German by blood and kinship. But the papers 
here show an expansion of citizenship to diasporas since the 1990s, which 
relaxed the earlier requirements for citizenship. If a person could speak 
Hungarian, that was good enough for citizenship according to the 2010 law.   
Or if  individuals were descended from a Korean generation deemed heroic as 
exiles detained by the Soviets or Chinese, then as an “overseas Korean,”  they 
were eligible for South Korean citizenship as stipulated by an 1899 law.   
Romanian laws date from 1991 and 1993; Hungarian from 2001 and 2010. In 
short, the category of diasporic citizenship expanded over the past thirty years.  
This is a legal category, based neither on blood nor residence: a new Hungarian 
citizen need not live in Hungary. Just as ideas of citizenship, nationality, and 
ethnicity were historically constructed, so, too, were these new categories of 
citizenship. And like the older ideas, they were being differently constructed 
around the world but in similar ways.  
   My third point relates to inclusion and exclusion, the terms use by  Yudai 
Anegawa, which  relate to all the papers. Citizens are always defined in terms 
of those who are aliens, who is included by who is excluded. Although the 
definition of internal others does change over time, there is also dispiritingly 
little change in many cases. In Eastern and Central Europe, Roma and Jews all 
too often remain the excluded internal others. Orban employs anti-Roma 
policies and rhetoric, evoking age-old stereotypes, which he now extends to 
refugees as well.  Koreans in Japan still suffer discrimination, and then there 
are the non-citizens in Estonia. What Seung-Min Lee here calls the politics of 
citizenship forms the background for all the immigration restrictions, laws, 
policies directed at these others within. Economic factors often underlie this 
politics. When the middle classes feel aggrieved, immigrants and internal 
others become the target, whether it’s Orban’s Hungary or Trump’s America.  
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Old discrimination gains renewedpurchase in times of socio-economic change, 
while other axes of inclusion and exclusion run along geopolitical rather than 
socioeconomic lines. 
   Some hostilities are traditional, between Russia and Poland, for example. 
Others relate to the changing world. Professor Anegawa points out that 
Orban’s rhetoric lumps “criminals” like the Roma, the poor, the homeless, 
together with  liberal Europeans, the EU, global capitalists, and George Soros 
as undesirable others. These odd couplings derive in part from regional 
relations within the EU, a political entity of recent origin. In East Asia the 
main regional challenge is the rise of China. There is as yet only faint 
glimmers of a potential AU, Asian Community, so it is  national hostilities that 
hold sway. The conflicts over war memory have created new generations of 
young South Koreans, Chinese, and Japanese who have learned to revile one 
another over the past twenty years, prey to what I call “hate nationalism,” the 
node where the politics of memory and citizenship intersect.  
   As a fourth point, I’d like to suggest something on the order of a “global 
geometry of citizenship.” What is the effect of creating citizens beyond borders?  
How does contemporary diasporic citizenship tie permanent emigrants who do 
not intend ever to return to, or live for the first time, in their nominal “home” 
country? There have been “overseas Chinese” for centuries, in greatest 
numbers in Southeast Asia – some fifty million today – and around the world.   
The Chinese government is now seeking to include more Chinese living abroad 
as “sons and daughters of the Chinese nation and descendants of the dragon.”  
“Overseas Koreans, in contrast, are a recent phenomenon. Singapore, the home 
of many overseas Chinese, has established a “diaspora strategy” to make use of 
the capacities of Singaporeans abroad for development at home, and other 
countries in Latin America, Africa, Europe are doing the same. So-called 
hyphenated Americans  increasingly engage in political and economic affairs in 
their countries of ancestral origin, as Indian-Americans, for example, do in 
India. Theirs is a different politics of memory that includes subsequent 
generations with no experiential ties to the home country in ethnic and 
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cultural  identities that stress both sides of the hyphen (Indian and American) 
in new ways.  
   Today we have been discussing how memory affects citizenship, so that we 
have to think about what strengthened diasporic ties means for practices of 
citizenship. Then there is the fact that diasporas often hold stronger memory 
claims than the people they are remembering. Third-generation Armenians in 
Europe and North America have long been fierce advocates for international 
recognition of the Armenian genocide, sometimes to the detriment of existing 
Armenian communities in Turkey. Memory activists among Chinese- and 
Korean-Americans and Chinese- and Korean Canadians have contributed 
greatly to raising international demands for Japan to confront its wartime 
actions in Asia. They do so as citizens of the United States or Canada and 
participants in the identity polities of those countries, but also as bearers of a 
counter-memory in East Asia.  
   A relevant question here is why governments are reaching for citizens 
beyond borders. Motivations obviously differ. We can see why Erdogan wants  
Turks resident in Germany to vote (for him) in the Turkish election (which two-
thirds of them did in 2018). Orban courted voters among overseas Hungarians, 
whose numbers had swelled since the expanded citizenship law of 2010, 
perhaps counting on the fact that diasporas frequently hold rather conservative 
views of the country they do not live in. Economics, of course, is another reason 
for government interest in diasporas: not only remittances, which are huge in 
global aggregrate (India receives the most, China next), but also investment 
from abroad. Orban may not want Soros’ money, but he doubtless would 
welcome support from politically like-minded wealthy émigrés. There are other 
reasons as well for expanding citizenship beyond borders, which affects notions 
of citizenship and practices of memory as well as the relationship between the 
two. 
   My fifth point has to do with memory itself and the commonalities among 
the narratives discussed in the papers. Overseas Koreans are presented as  
independence fighters and national victims of colonialism, two characteristics 
that form the basis for citizenship. China’s national narrative juxtaposes five 
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thousand years of glorious history against the resilience after a “century and a 
half of humiliation” by imperial powers. Hungary harks back to the Treaty of 
Trianon as the moment of national betrayal, while the Baltics fasten on the 
Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact of 1940 as the peak of Soviet perfidy. These highly 
selective national narratives are woven into the discourse on citizenship, as 
we’ve seen in the quotations from the Romanian and Hungarian laws. In 
Eastern Europe all are victims of Nazism and Communism together, as 
exhibited in the House of Terror in Budapest. Poland has its  heroes and 
martyrs, on the one hand, and  its victims of Nazism and Communism on the 
other. All exemplify what Jie-Hyun Lim calls “victimhood nationalism.” The 
Chinese and Koreans are victims of Japanese imperialism, and the Japanese 
are victims of the atomic bomb. Another question then is why countries, 
including those as strong as China, are so drawn to victimhood nationalism. It 
isn’t necessarily either obvious or commonsensical that victimization should 
have become the common coin of national memory. It certainly was not the case 
in nineteenth-century nation-states, and is likely not to remain the case 
forever. So why this historical commonality at this time?  
   The constructed narratives of victimhood nationalism often share a retro 
nostalgia for a better, if not a golden, age. For Putin, it is the Russian empire – 
and Stalin. For Hungary, Professor Anegawa tell us, the interwar years are 
seen as good, before the arrival of Nazism. Like the narratives of victimhood, 
these evocations of earlier  periods are selective fairy-tales of memory rather 
than factual renderings of history. One might call this esteem of interwar 
Hungary “illiberal memory,” which fits with Orban’s embrace of “illiberal 
democracy.” These uses of the past I see as a problem in the politics of memory 
rather more  than in the politics of citizenship.  
   The politics of memory has many uses: it can create national unity, it can 
address past grievances; it can pursue justice; and it can foster reconciliation. 
Much of the work on memory since the 1990s has recognized the beneficial 
aspects of memory. But we also know how divisive and negative memory can be, 
as these papers show so well, in that it is clear that people within and across 
societies do not all agree to tell – or to believe in – these selective stories of 
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inclusion and exclusion, of national and nationalistic identity. Societies have 
divided memories internally and of course geopolitically, as Professor 
Hashimoto has shown in his book, national memories can be both divisive and 
dangerous. The right wing feeds off the backlash against what the French call 
the “duty to remember.” You hear it in the assertion that  Hungarians are all 
Christians together and in the negative remarks in Eastern Europe on  the 
emphasis on Holocaust memory as a Western European obsession. The papers 
today show that memory is both beneficial and dangerous in national, regional, 
and global terms, and that it is our responsibility as scholars and as citizens to 
practice as informed and complex a memory politics as we possibly can.  
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Citizenship as moral capital in Eastern Europe  
and East Asia: comment 
 
Zuzanna Bogumił 
 
I would like to start with a quick general remark on all three papers. 
They show that it is far too early to declare the end of national citizenship and 
proclaim the arrival of global, transnational, or post-national citizenship. All 
papers argue that national citizenship holds merit and is strengthened by the 
enactment of newer and newer laws. The papers also confirm that the 
discussion is not about national citizenship, but rather ethno-citizenship, for 
new regulations do not concern the migrants but the ethnic kin. 
Sara Park’s paper is a historical one. The paper presents the process of 
how Koreans as an ethnic group was understood and how the statues of 
Koreans were legalized in postwar Japan. However, in the last sentence of her 
paper, Park claims that “the category of Korean is still used today”. Does the 
statement imply that the manner in which the image of “Koreans” was 
constructed in postwar Japan has come to affect the manner in which the 
Koreans are perceived nowadays in Japan? Where there some other  laws, later 
adopted, which changed the understanding of Korean? As shown by Park, these 
questions are highly pertinent for if the legislation adopted in the postwar 
period was very strongly inspired by the Alien forces, changing the law would 
mean de-colonialization or de-westernization of the understanding of 
citizenship. 
Seung-Min Lee’s paper is a fascinating study on the way the Korean 
citizens abroad and ethnic Koreans of foreign citizenship become members of 
the national community, and how later owing to new legislations, some 
amongst them are excluded from this community. However, Seung-Min Lee 
does not explain the manner in which he understands this exclusion. She does 
not explain why Koreans of foreign citizenship were excluded from the national 
community. A question that arises is whether these changes in legislations 
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provoked by changes in memory about this particular ethnic-kin or by some 
economic reasons? 
Yudai Anegawa in his paper provides a detailed picture of contemporary 
Hungarian citizenship politics. He presents how the enactment of a new 
legislation law instigates the exclusion of more and more groups, or to put it in 
other words, marginalized in the society. This paper primarily deals with the 
internal Hungarian politics and perfectly fulfills the objective of the 
Constantin Iordachi paper on dual citizenship and reimagined national 
communities in post-communist Hungary. The key concept that Anegawa uses 
in explaining Hungarian politics is “Christian Nationalism,” mentioned in the 
title of his paper. While this idea is seductive, however, it requires some 
clarification. The point to be noted is that what Anegawa calls Christian 
nationalism is rather, a manifestation of national heritage. The uses of past 
described by him are uses of “religious symbols and narratives as Hungarian” 
one rather than Christian. After Geneviève Zubrzycki, one may describe this 
process as ‘the secularization of religion and religious symbols through their 
political instrumentalization and then their re-sacralization as national 
symbols’1. 
The last paper by Constantin Iordachi dealt with the problem of using 
citizenship as a “toll” for nation building across state borders. This 
phenomenon is highly problematic and such legislations are opposed by the 
neighboring states. Constantin Iordachi in his paper shows how enactment of 
such a legislation ignites a reaction and enactment of a similar legislation by 
the neighboring countries. 
The Status Law enacted by Hungary resembles the Overseas Korean Act.  
The laws represent the same process, namely trans-sovereign nationalism, 
which aims to reconstitute the nation across borders and achieve “national 
reunification” without changing the borders2. We also see similar processes 
 
1 Zubrzycki,Geneviève, The Crosses of Auschwitz: Nationalism and Religion in Post-
Communist Poland (Chicago:University of Chicago Press, 2006, p. 220). 
2 Edith Oltay, “Concepts of Citizenship in Eastern and Western Europe,”Acta Universitatis 
Sapientiae, European and Regional Studies, 11.1 (2017), 43–62 
<https://doi.org/10.1515/auseur-2017-0003>. 
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taking place in Eastern Europe and East Asia. However, this trans-sovereign 
nationalism is dealt differently in Europe and Asia. Europe has supranational 
legislation concerning the EU citizenship. For instance, the European 
convention on Nationality, adopted in 1997, accepts multiple citizenship and 
promotes de-ethnicization of citizenship. While countries may enact their own 
laws (Hungary serves as a great example), however, the national laws should 
correspond with the European law. The case of East Asia is different, for there 
is no such supranational, global, or transnational legislation, which regulate 
national regulations. 
My last comment, perhaps the most important comment is on the uses of 
memory and history in the understanding of citizenship. Having read all four 
papers, I argue that it is not the memory itself, but rather the history politics, 
which is crucial in understanding this process. If the memory is considered 
seriously in the construction of citizenship, memory would rather construct a 
global or de-nationalized citizenship. Such citizenship would be fragile and 
inclusive of the different voices in the past. However, as all the four authors 
showed, the past is used in the construction of the citizenship not only to 
provide voice to certain groups, but also to help acquire moral capital for the 
state. To explain my arguments, I refer to the book written by Polish 
sociologists, Michał Łuczewski titled “Historical politics: moral capital in the 
time of late modernity”3. Łuczewski claims that in the period of late modernity, 
economic capital becomes less and less important and the significance of  the 
moral capital increases. The birth of history politics refers to the uses of 
different memory media for the construction and reconstruction of moral 
capital of the national community. Łuczewski analyzed modern museums in 
Germany, Poland and Russia as the result of the respective states’ historical 
politics. I would like to argue that the legislation of citizenship is an  important 
medium in acquiring such a moral capital. This is necessary to be discussed 
together with other manifestations visible today that talk about returning to 
 
3 Michał Łuczewski, Kapitał Moralny. Polityki Historyczne w Późnej Nowoczesności  
(Kraków: Ośrodek Myśli Politycznej, 2017).  
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the past. By defining the citizenship, the state constructs story about its 
ancestors, which carries strong moral power.  
Based on such a perspective, citizenship can be perceived as a historical 
compensation for the injustices ethnic kin experienced in the neighboring 
countries in the past. As the ethnic kin suffered at the hands of the other, their 
story carried strong moral component; thus, the current state that remembers 
this story becomes a moral subject. It is through such ways that a nation 
acquires a strong moral capital, which may be used in its political fights, both 
at the internal and international level.   
